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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Curtis Whiteford and Michael Wheeler were officers 
in the United States Army Reserve who were deployed to Iraq 
in 2003 to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority. Both 
defendants were convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 
371, for participating in a bid-rigging scheme that involved 
directing millions of dollars in contracts to companies owned 
by Philip Bloom, an American businessman. Whiteford and 
Wheeler raise the following claims on appeal: (1) 
insufficiency of the evidence to establish each defendant‟s 
participation in the conspiracy; (2) failure to grant a new trial 
in the interests of justice; and (3) erroneous refusal to grant 
“use immunity” to a co-conspirator. Wheeler also argues his 
motion to suppress was erroneously denied. In addition, both 
defendants challenge their sentences. We will affirm.
1
  
I. 
The Coalition Provisional Authority 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) was 
created in May 2003 by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and other members of the Coalition Forces to 
function as a temporary governing body in Iraq. U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed 
Ambassador Paul Bremer to serve as Administrator of the 
                                                 
1
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
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CPA, and shortly after it was established, the U.N. Security 
Council passed a resolution recognizing the CPA‟s 
legitimacy. The U.N.‟s resolution called upon the CPA to 
“promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective 
administration of the territory . . . .” See S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 4, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). For the next fourteen 
months, the CPA carried out this mandate by administering 
humanitarian programs and reconstruction projects. To 
finance its operations, it drew on two sources of funding: U.S. 
congressional appropriations,
2
 and the Development Fund for 
Iraq (“DFI”).3 On June 28, 2004, the CPA was replaced by 
the Interim Government of Iraq, a sovereign Iraqi entity. 
The CPA‟s staff, about 3,000 persons, consisted of 
employees sent by the Governments of Australia, Denmark, 
Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other 
members of the Coalition Forces. For its part, the United 
                                                 
2
In 2003, Congress appropriated $698 million to the CPA. 
Over the remainder of 2003 and 2004, Congress dedicated 
another $24.1 billion. Pre-Sentencing Report (“PSR”) ¶ 35.  
3
The DFI included $2 billion in Iraqi assets seized by the 
United States during the first Gulf War, $1 billion from the 
Oil for Food Program, funding from the World Bank, and 
contributions from Coalition Forces countries. PSR ¶ 35; see 
also United States ex. rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 
562 F.3d 295, 298-299 (4th Cir. 2009). The CPA was given 
discretion in spending money from the DFI. See S.C. Res. 
1483 at ¶13 (noting “that the funds in the Development Fund 
for Iraq shall be disbursed at the discretion of the [Coalition 
Provisional] Authority”). 
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States contributed both active-duty service members, 
including reserves, as well as civilian employees. While 
assigned to the CPA, members of the U.S. armed forces 
continued to be bound by the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, see 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1), whose provisions apply “in 
all places,” id. § 805. Military officers also continued to be 
bound by Part 2635 of Title 5 of the Federal Code of 
Regulations, which sets forth “standards for ethical conduct” 
for employees of the Executive Branch. 5 C.F.R. § 
2635.101(c). Part 2635 extends to persons “on detail” to an 
international organization, unless they are specifically 
exempted. Id. § 2635.104(c). Given that officers are 
considered “employees” of the Department of Defense 
(“DoD”), id. § 2635.102(h) (“Employee . . . includes officers 
but not enlisted members of the uniformed services.”), they 
are bound by Part 2635, and face potential penalties if they 
deviate from its instructions, id. §§ 2635.106(a), 3601.101. 
As Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army 
Reserve, Whiteford and Wheeler, respectively, were 
“officers.” 
The CPA promulgated rules, memoranda, and orders 
which carried the force of law in Iraq. See CPA Official 
Documents, The Coalition Provisional Authority, 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/ (last visited Feb. 12, 
2012). Memorandum Number 4, issued on August 19, 2003, 
governed contracting procedures. It provided that: 
“competition is mandatory for all Contracts”; “[r]easonable 
efforts will be made to obtain competitive offers by 
publicizing a solicitation”; “[g]rants administered under this 
Memorandum will not directly or indirectly benefit any 
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Ministry, CPA or Coalition Forces official or employee 
involved in the contracting or grant-making process”; 
“[p]ersons involved in the contracting process . . . shall not . . 
. [u]se public office for private gain”; requirements on a 
project “may not be split to avoid the application of these 
rules”; and contracts in excess of $500,000 shall be approved 
by a special “Award Committee.” See CPA, Coalition 
Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 4: Contract and 
Grant Procedures Applicable to Vesterd [sic] and Seized 
Iraqi Property and the Development Fund for Iraq, §§ 6(2), 
6(5), 6(6), & 7 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations. 
The Defendants  
Curtis Whiteford was a Colonel in the U.S. Army 
Reserve who lived in Utah. In September 2003, he was 
deployed to Iraq on active duty. He was assigned to the 
CPA‟s headquarters in the South Central Region (“CPA-
SC”), located in al-Hillah.4 Whiteford was appointed Chief of 
Staff for CPA-SC, which made him the second most senior 
person in the office after Regional Coordinator Michael 
Gfoeller. Whiteford‟s responsibilities included supervising 
CPA-SC‟s staff, overseeing CPA-SC‟s budget of $100 
                                                 
4
The CPA was divided into five regions, each of which was 
directed by a Regional Coordinator. The South Central region 
included the cities of Karbala and al-Hillah, and encompassed 
50 percent of the land mass and 48 percent of the population 
of Iraq.  
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million, managing CPA-SC‟s reconstruction projects, and 
serving as a liaison between the CPA and Iraqi nationals.  
Michael Wheeler was a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. 
Army Reserve who lived in Wisconsin. In October 2003, he 
was deployed to Iraq on active duty. He was sent to al-Hillah, 
to work for the CPA. Wheeler was appointed Deputy Chief of 
Staff and Deputy Civil Administrator for CPA-SC. This made 
him responsible for recommending reconstruction projects, 
facilitating payments from the CPA to contractors, and 
ensuring that CPA-sponsored projects were completed in a 
satisfactory manner.  
The Conspiracy 
Besides Whiteford and Wheeler, there were six other 
persons either charged with or who pled guilty to 
participating in the conspiracy to defraud the CPA. These 
individuals were: (1) Philip Bloom, a U.S. citizen residing in 
Romania, who owned and managed construction companies 
throughout the world. One of Bloom‟s companies, Global 
Business Group Logistics (“GBG Logistics”), entered into 
numerous contracts with the CPA and the DoD to carry out 
construction projects in Iraq. (2) Bruce Hopfengardner, a 
Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve, who served in 
al-Hillah from September 2003 through June 2004. 
Hopfengardner was an Operations Officer for CPA-SC, 
reporting to Whiteford. His core duties were to oversee 
police-related construction projects and to help train the Iraqi 
police. (3) Robert Stein, a contract employee of the DoD, who 
served as Comptroller for CPA-SC between November 2003 
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and June 2004, and reported to Whiteford. Stein‟s position 
gave him unmonitored access to the CPA‟s vault. (4) Debra 
Harrison, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve 
residing in New Jersey, who was deployed to Iraq from 
October 2003 to July 2004. Harrison served as a financial 
specialist and Deputy Comptroller for CPA-SC. In both 
positions, she fell under Whiteford‟s chain of command. (5) 
Seymour Morris, a U.S. citizen residing in Romania, who 
operated a Cyprus-based financial services business and 
worked closely with Bloom. (6) William Driver, Harrison‟s 
husband. 
The conspiracy was hatched in December 2003. While 
visiting the CPA‟s headquarters in Baghdad, Philip Bloom 
met with Stein and Hopfengardner, with whom he was 
familiar. The three men formed an arrangement: Bloom 
would pay Stein and Hopfengardner $100,000 up front and 
$10,000 per month, each, if they would help Bloom secure 
contracts from CPA-SC. Stein, who was Comptroller of CPA-
SC, could withdraw money from the vault at any point. 
Hopfengardner, who oversaw the office‟s security projects, 
could provide Bloom with inside information on bidding to 
enable Bloom to secure contracts.  
Shortly after the Baghdad meeting, several top 
officials at CPA-SC convened to discuss the police academy 
construction project. Whiteford, Wheeler, Hopfengardner, 
and Stein were present, as were others who were not alleged 
co-conspirators, such as Regional Coordinator Mike Gfoeller. 
The officials at the CPA-SC meeting collectively decided to 
break the police academy construction project into pieces, 
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each under $500,000. This would enable CPA-SC to evade 
CPA regulations, which mandated that contracts over 
$500,000 be sent to the Head of Contracting Activity for the 
CPA, in Baghdad, for review and approval. See CPA, 
Memorandum Number 4, § 7, supra. Gfoeller supported the 
idea because he wanted to avoid delays in building the police 
academy. The co-conspirators had personal motives in 
supporting the policy change, because it meant Bloom‟s 
companies could receive the police academy contracts 
without interference from the CPA office in Baghdad.  
In January 2004, Stein brought Michael Wheeler into 
the fold. Wheeler‟s position was key: he was more intimately 
involved in the details of the contracting process at CPA-SC 
than Stein or Hopfengardner. Over the next several months, 
Wheeler helped GBG Logistics secure roughly $5.5 million in 
contracts. He would develop “scopes of work” that lined up 
with the firm‟s capabilities, recommend modifications to their 
bids to help them win approval, and direct Bloom to disguise 
the bids so it was not obvious that GBG Logistics was 
securing so many contracts. In return, Wheeler received 
airplane tickets, liquor, and other gifts from Bloom. In July, 
Wheeler helped smuggle money out of Iraq, when he flew to 
the United States with Debra Harrison on airplane tickets 
purchased by Bloom. Harrison was carrying $330,000 in 
stolen CPA funds at the time. She paid Wheeler $1,000 and 
covered the cost of his hotels and meals on the trip.   
Although Whiteford was not at the initial Baghdad 
meeting between Bloom, Stein and Hopfengardner, he began 
receiving gifts from Bloom in February 2004. First, he 
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received an expensive watch and a laptop. Next, he received 
$10,000 in cash to purchase a business-class airplane ticket 
home. Although these items were handed to Whiteford by 
Stein or Hopfengardner, they had been purchased by Bloom. 
In March, Whiteford and Bloom exchanged emails about 
starting an airline company in Iraq, and Bloom offered 
Whiteford the job of president. Whiteford replied that he 
could not accept the position while on active duty for the U.S. 
military, but in May, he emailed Bloom information for the 
proposed airline – such as which airports in Iraq would be 
controlled by the Iraqi government and which would remain 
under the control of the Coalition Forces, and how to apply to 
either authority to provide airline services. He subsequently 
asked Bloom for help in obtaining a sportscar. In May, 
Whiteford accepted a business-class airplane ticket home that 
was purchased by Bloom. 
Over the course of the conspiracy, Stein, 
Hopfengardner, Wheeler, Whiteford, and others helped 
Bloom obtain $8 million in contracts from CPA-SC. These 
included contracts for a new Iraqi police academy in al-
Hillah, contracts to build a Regional Tribal Democracy 
Center in al-Hillah, and contracts to construct a library in 
Karbala. On a regular basis, Stein stole money from CPA-
SC‟s vault and handed it to Bloom, who wire-transferred the 
funds to foreign bank accounts. Bloom used the stolen CPA 
funds as well as his own finances to purchase watches, 
laptops, airplane tickets, and cars for his co-conspirators.  
As the bid-rigging and contract-steering to Bloom was 
underway, Stein, Whiteford, and Hopfengardner discussed 
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starting a private security company after completing their 
services with the military. In early 2004, Stein and 
Hopfengardner ordered a batch of weapons through CPA-SC 
intending to keep them after the CPA dissolved, for use by 
their company. Stein arranged for the weapons to be delivered 
to a military base in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where 
Whiteford would pick them up. When the weapons were not 
ready in time, Harrison and Wheeler agreed to help. After 
their return to the United States in July 2004, they retrieved 
the weapons from North Carolina and drove them to Stein‟s 
home. Stein permitted Wheeler to keep several pistols, a 
machine gun, and a silencer.  
Arrests and Interviews 
In 2006, Stein, Bloom, and Hopfengardner entered into 
plea agreements with the federal government and agreed to 
serve as cooperating witnesses. Bloom pled guilty to 
conspiracy, bribery, and money laundering. He was sentenced 
to 46 months‟ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $3.6 
million. Stein pled guilty to conspiracy, bribery, and other 
charges. He was sentenced to 108 months‟ imprisonment and 
ordered to forfeit $3.6 million. Hopfengardner pled guilty to 
conspiracy and money laundering. He was sentenced to 21 
months‟ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $144,500.  
As the co-conspirators were negotiating these 
agreements, the federal authorities also began to investigate 
Wheeler. In July 2005, FBI Agent Courtland Jones called 
Wheeler by telephone and asked if he had moved weapons 
from Fort Bragg to Stein‟s home. Wheeler answered yes. On 
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the morning of November 30, 2005, Wheeler visited an 
attorney, and asked what he should do if he were questioned 
by investigators. His lawyer told him to cooperate with 
questioning, but to call him if he “got stumped.” Later that 
same day, at 1:00 p.m., a group of federal agents including 
Agent Jones arrived at Wheeler‟s home. They came upon 
Wheeler standing in his driveway. Wheeler asked if the 
agents were there to talk about Stein. Agent Jones answered 
yes, “and other things,” reminding Wheeler of their phone 
conversation. Wheeler informed the agents he had spoken 
with an attorney, who had instructed him to cooperate but to 
call if he “got stumped.” At this point, the agents informed 
Wheeler he was under arrest, placed him in handcuffs, and 
directed him to sit in their van. About ten minutes later, the 
agents removed the handcuffs and gave Wheeler an Advice of 
Rights form, which he signed. They proceeded to ask him 
about the weapons from Fort Bragg. Wheeler responded they 
were in his bedroom closet. At 1:28 p.m., Wheeler signed a 
form consenting to a search of his residence. The agents 
searched his home, and recovered many weapons not 
registered in his name. For about one and a half hours, the 
agents questioned Wheeler in his kitchen. The interview 
terminated when Wheeler‟s daughter came home, and 
Wheeler was taken to the local sheriff‟s office. In the car, he 
requested a phone to call his attorney, and the questioning 
ceased. 
Procedural History 
 On February 1, 2007, a grand jury returned a 25-count 
indictment against Whiteford, Wheeler, Harrison, Morris, and 
13 
 
Driver. Whiteford and Wheeler were charged with conspiring 
to commit offenses against the United States (18 U.S.C. § 
371); bribery (18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)); and eleven counts of 
honest services wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 1346). The 
indictment set forth the aims of the conspiracy: bribery, wire 
fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property (18 U.S.C. § 
2314), and possession and transportation of unregistered 
firearms (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).
 
Additionally, Wheeler was 
charged with interstate transportation of stolen property and 
smuggling bulk cash (31 U.S.C. § 5332).
5
  
Before trial, Harrison and Driver were severed from 
the case and each pled guilty to certain offenses.
6
 Also before 
trial, Wheeler filed a motion to suppress his post-arrest 
statements and the weapons recovered from his house, which 
the court denied.  On September 8, 2008, Whiteford, Wheeler 
and Morris went to trial.  On November 7, the jury returned 
its verdict. It found Whiteford guilty of conspiring to commit 
                                                 
5
Harrison was charged with conspiracy, bribery, eleven 
counts of wire fraud, four counts of transporting stolen 
property in interstate commerce, four counts of money 
laundering, and one count of tax fraud. Morris was charged 
with conspiracy and eleven counts of wire fraud. Driver was 
charged with four counts of money laundering.  
6
Harrison pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, and Driver to 
one count of money laundering. At the time of trial, Harrison 
still awaited her sentence on the wire fraud plea, which turned 
out to be 30 months‟ imprisonment followed by two years‟ 
supervised release. Driver was sentenced to three years‟ 
probation. 
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bribery and interstate transportation of stolen property, and 
Wheeler guilty of conspiring to commit all four crimes in the 
indictment. It found Whiteford and Wheeler not guilty of all 
remaining charges, and Morris not guilty of any charge. 
Whiteford and Wheeler filed post-judgment motions, which 
the court denied. The court sentenced Whiteford to 60 
months‟ imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised 
release, and Wheeler to 42 months‟ imprisonment, followed 
by three years of supervised release. It ordered Whiteford to 
pay $16,200 in restitution, and Wheeler to pay $1,200.  
II. 
In their first claim of error, Wheeler and Whiteford 
contend they should be acquitted because their convictions 
were supported by insufficient evidence. We review the  
denial of their post-judgment motions advancing such claims 
de novo, but in a manner “particularly deferential” to the 
jury‟s verdict.  United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d 
Cir. 2008). We “view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the government and must sustain the jury‟s verdict if a 
reasonable jury believing the government‟s evidence could 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). We “examine the 
totality of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial,” and 
“credit all available inferences in favor of the government.” 
United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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A. 
The federal conspiracy statute at 18 U.S.C. § 371 
provides: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit 
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United 
States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be [fined or 
imprisoned].” As is clear from the text, Section 371 has two 
alternative prongs: an “offenses” prong, which pertains to 
conspiracies to violate any federal law, civil or criminal, and 
a “defraud” prong, which pertains to conspiracies to defraud 
the United States. United States v. Alston, 77 F.3d 713, 718 
(3d Cir. 1996). The latter may be accomplished by conspiring 
to cheat the U.S. government of money or property, or to 
interfere with its operations. United States v. McKee, 506 
F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007). 
To prevail in a conspiracy prosecution, the government 
must prove each of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: (1) an agreement between two or more 
persons to achieve an unlawful goal; (2) the defendant 
intentionally joined the agreement, with knowledge of its 
objective; and (3) an overt act taken in furtherance of the 
conspiracy by a co-conspirator. United States v. Rigas, 605 
F.3d 194, 206 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. 
Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2002). The government 
can prove the existence of the conspiratorial agreement and 
the knowledge of the defendant with circumstantial evidence 
alone. United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 208 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“We have [] recognized that the existence of a 
conspiratorial agreement may be proven by circumstantial 
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evidence alone.”); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201-
03 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding a co-conspirator‟s knowledge can 
be proven with circumstantial evidence). Moreover, “[t]he 
government need only prove that the defendant agreed with at 
least one of the persons named in the indictment that they or 
one of them would perform an unlawful act.” United States v. 
Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1989). “Failing to prove 
that all named co-conspirators conspired with the defendant is 
not fatal to the government‟s case.” Id. 
B. 
Whiteford and Wheeler concede the evidence was 
sufficient to show the existence of a conspiratorial agreement 
to defraud CPA-SC, as well as overt acts taken in furtherance 
of that conspiracy. Thus, they concede the evidence was 
sufficient to prove elements 1 (agreement) and 3 (overt acts) 
of their conspiracy charges. But they claim there was 
insufficient evidence to prove the second element – their own 
participation in the conspiracy, undertaken intentionally and 
with knowledge of its objectives. Whiteford contends there is 
no proof he knew of the bid-rigging scheme among his 
subordinates, nor that he intended to further the scheme. 
Wheeler claims he “knew nothing about the [Baghdad] 
meeting, the financial arrangements with Bloom, or the 
agreement to steer contracts to Bloom in return for payment,” 
and urges that the record fails to show otherwise.  
Whiteford and Wheeler‟s insufficiency arguments are 
unavailing. As to Whiteford, the jury found him guilty of 
conspiring to commit two offenses: bribery (18 U.S.C. § 
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201(b)(2)), and interstate transportation of stolen property (18 
U.S.C.§ 2314). There was sufficient evidence of Whiteford‟s 
knowledge and intent as to each. With respect to bribery, 
Whiteford admitted he was aware that GBG Logistics was 
winning an “unusual” share of bids from CPA-SC and that 
Stein was regularly giving Bloom large amounts of cash. The 
evidence showed he was part of the group that decided to 
break the police academy contracts into smaller ones (under 
$500,000), and was in part responsible for the unusual level 
of access Bloom had to the CPA compound. Meanwhile, 
there was considerable evidence of Whiteford‟s personal 
receipt of benefits. Stein and Hopfengardner testified to 
witnessing Whiteford accept a $3,500 watch, a laptop, and an 
expensive business-class airplane ticket to Utah, all of which 
had been purchased by Bloom. Whiteford accepted these gifts 
outside of the normal procurement process – he did not fill 
out any paperwork – and Stein testified he told Whiteford that 
Bloom had purchased the business-class ticket. The 
government also presented emails in which Whiteford gave 
Bloom information about starting an airline in Iraq and asked 
for help in obtaining a sportscar in return. At the time he 
made such a request, Whiteford knew Bloom had offered 
Hopfengardner an expensive car as a gift. Altogether, this 
evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to find that Whiteford 
knew of or closed his eyes towards the bribery scheme among 
CPA-SC officials and Philip Bloom, and that he intended for 
the scheme to continue so he could reap personal benefits. See 
United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding an individual‟s participation in a conspiracy may be 
“demonstrated by showing that a defendant . . . „deliberately 
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closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to 
him‟”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Clay, 618 
F.3d 946, 953 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A willful blindness 
instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of 
guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of 
deliberate ignorance.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).
7
 
Whiteford proffers a separate reason why the evidence 
was insufficient to show his participation in a conspiracy to 
commit bribery: during the time in question, he was not a 
“public official” performing “official acts.” This argument 
lacks merit. The bribery statute underlying Whiteford‟s 
conspiracy conviction makes it a crime for a “a public official 
. . . [to] seek[], receive[], accept[], or agree[] to receive or 
accept anything of value . . . in return for . . . being influenced 
in the performance of any official act.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). 
The term “public official” is defined as any “officer or 
employee . . . acting for or on behalf of the United States . . . 
in any official function, under or by authority of any such 
                                                 
7
For further support of the notion that willful blindness can 
satisfy the knowledge requirement, see Third Circuit Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions § 5.06 (“When . . . knowledge of a 
particular fact or circumstance is an essential part of the 
offense charged, the government may prove that (name) knew 
of that fact or circumstance if the evidence proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (name) deliberately closed (his) (her) 
eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to (him) 
(her). No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by 
deliberately ignoring what is obvious.”). 
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department[.]” Id. § 201(a)(1). The term “official act” means 
“any decision or action . . . in such official‟s official capacity, 
or in such official‟s place of trust or profit.” Id. § 201(a)(3). 
Whiteford and Wheeler were “employees” of the federal 
government when they were deployed to Iraq. 5 C.F.R. § 
2635.102(h) (providing that officers in the uniformed services 
are employees of the DoD). Their acts assisting Bloom were 
taken in their “place of trust” at CPA-SC. Accordingly, 
Whiteford and Wheeler were “public officials” in the 
performance of “official acts” during the time in question, 
and 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) applied to their conduct. See 
Dixson v. United Sates, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984) (holding the 
federal bribery statute is “„applicable to all persons 
performing activities for or on behalf of the United States,‟ 
whatever the form of delegation of authority”) (citation 
omitted); United States v. Kidd, 734 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (holding an Army private was a “public official” 
under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)). 
There was also sufficient evidence of Whiteford‟s 
knowledge and intent as to the transportation of stolen 
property objective. Stein testified to giving Whiteford 
$10,000 from the CPA vault in February 2004, after 
Whiteford approached Stein and asked him for assistance in 
going on leave. Stein explained it was “obvious” the money 
came from the vault – there were no ATM machines in al-
Hillah, and Stein had handed Whiteford a “banded packet” of 
cash, which was how funds in the vault were packaged. 
Although CPA rules forbade using vault funds for personal 
travel expenditures, Whiteford took the $10,000 and 
purchased a business-class ticket home. He also transported 
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$3,500 in “left over” money into the United States and tried 
to give it to his wife – who refused to accept it, because she 
thought it was stolen. From this evidence, the jury could have 
concluded Whiteford knew the money was stolen, and 
intended to transport stolen property in interstate commerce.  
As to Wheeler, the evidence was also sufficient to 
support his conviction for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
The jury found Wheeler guilty of conspiring to commit 
bribery, wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen 
property, and unlawful possession of firearms. There was 
ample evidence of Wheeler‟s knowledge and intent as to 
each. With respect to bribery, the government presented 
emails and witness testimony demonstrating that Wheeler 
regularly provided Bloom with inside information about bids, 
coached him in modifying his proposals so they better fit the 
CPA‟s specifications, and told him to submit bids under 
different company names so that he could win more contracts. 
In return, Bloom provided Wheeler airplane tickets, weapons, 
and liquor. With respect to honest services wire fraud, the 
government presented records of numerous wire transfers 
made by Bloom in which he moved stolen-CPA funds into 
foreign bank accounts. Bloom then used the funds to pay 
kick-backs to his co-conspirators. Because Wheeler was a 
member of the bribery conspiracy and was intimately 
involved in the contracting process at CPA-SC, it was 
reasonable for the jury to find that Wheeler knew of the wire 
transfers. With respect to interstate transportation of stolen 
property, the government presented records showing that 
Wheeler flew to the United States with Debra Harrison in 
July 2004, on airplane tickets purchased by Bloom. As noted, 
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Harrison was transporting $330,00 in stolen CPA funds on 
this flight, and in email to Stein, she told him she had given 
Wheeler $1,000 and paid for his rooms and meals. Finally, as 
to the possession of unregistered firearms, a federal agent 
testified for the government that two pistols, a rifle, a 
machine gun, and a silencer were seized from Wheeler‟s 
home, and none were registered to him under the National 
Firearms and Registry Record. Accordingly, this evidence 
provided the jury sufficient grounds to find Wheeler guilty of 
conspiring to achieve all four charged objectives. 
C. 
Whiteford and Wheeler contest the sufficiency of the 
evidence in yet another manner: they argue the evidence was 
insufficient because the government failed to prove the CPA 
is part of the U.S. government. In making this claim, the 
defendants assert that any conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371 
requires that the United States be the intended target of the 
conspiratorial scheme. Because the government failed to 
show the CPA was a U.S. entity, the defendants claim, the 
evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. 
This argument lacks merit. As explained supra, 
Section 371 of Title 18 has both an “offenses” prong and a 
“defraud” prong. Only the latter requires that the conspirators 
intend to harm the federal government. Compare United 
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (holding, in an 
“offenses” prosecution under § 371, it was not necessary to 
prove the defendant knew the intended victim was a federal 
officer), with McKee, 506 F.3d at 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding, 
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in a “defraud” prosecution under § 371, there was sufficient 
proof of defendants‟ “advocacy of non-tax-payment [to the 
federal government] as well as overt acts and omissions . . . to 
effectuate those goals”), and United States v. Rankin, 870 
F.2d 109, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding, in a “defraud” 
prosecution under § 371, the indictment pled sufficient facts 
to allege defendants intended “to defraud the United States by 
impairing the lawful function of the United States District 
Court”). Meanwhile, the indictment, jury instructions, and 
verdict sheets all make clear that Whiteford and Wheeler 
were charged with, tried for, and convicted of, violating the 
“offenses” prong of § 371. Even the underlying crimes which 
Whiteford and Wheeler were found guilty of conspiring to 
achieve – bribery, interstate transportation of stolen property, 
wire fraud, and unlawful possession of weapons – do not 
require the United States to be the intended target of the 
criminal activity.
8
  Accordingly, the status of the CPA as a 
U.S. entity has no bearing on the sufficiency of the evidence.  
                                                 
8
See 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2)(A) (making it unlawful for “a public 
official” to “receive[], accept[], or agree[] to receive or accept 
anything of value . . . in return for . . . being influenced in the 
performance of any official act”); 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (making 
it unlawful to transport “any goods . . . securities or money, of 
the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been 
stolen”);  18 U.S.C. § 1343 (“Whoever, having devised . . . 
any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . transmits or causes to be 
transmitted by means of wire . . . in interstate or foreign 
commerce, any writings . . . shall be [punished].”); 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5861(d) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to receive 
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III. 
 In the alternative, Whiteford and Wheeler request new 
trials “in the interest of justice” under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 
33(b) for two reasons. First, they claim a private attorney for 
Philip Bloom was “coaching” him from the courtroom while 
he testified, thereby tainting the jury‟s verdict. Because the 
fact of Bloom‟s coaching was confirmed only after the trial 
concluded, the defendants argue, it qualifies as “newly 
discovered evidence” and warrants a new trial.9 Second, 
                                                                                                             
or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the 
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.”). 
9In the middle of Bloom‟s cross-examination by Morris‟s 
counsel, Whiteford‟s attorney requested a sidebar. He 
informed the District Judge that based on his observations and 
those of Whiteford‟s wife, he believed a lawyer for Bloom 
had been making gestures to him from the courtroom as he 
testified. The District Judge instructed a deputy to watch the 
person indicated, and the deputy “observed nothing.” No 
curative instruction was given, and none of Bloom‟s 
testimony was stricken. It turned out the “private attorney” 
Whiteford‟s counsel referred to was an associate who had 
joined the law firm representing Bloom two weeks earlier. 
The associate had not yet passed the bar nor worked on the 
case, and was sent to court solely to watch. After the jury 
rendered its verdict, the District Judge met with each juror to 
thank them for their service. During one such meeting, one 
juror suggested to the District Judge that he or she had seen a 
person making gestures to Bloom while he testified. The 
court informed the parties.  
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Whiteford and Wheeler contend a new trial is necessary 
because the court did not charge the jury as to the identities of 
the co-conspirators. We review the court‟s denial of 
Whiteford and Wheeler‟s post-judgment motions, in which 
they advanced these claims, for abuse of discretion. United 
States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002).
10
 
The District Court did not err in declining to grant 
Whiteford and Wheeler new trials “in the interest of justice.” 
As to the alleged “coaching” of Bloom by a lawyer who 
turned out to be an associate from the firm representing 
Bloom, such a fact, assuming it qualifies as “newly 
discovered evidence,” would only warrant a new trial if it was 
“of such nature, as that . . . [it] would probably produce an 
acquittal.” United States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383, 388-89 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[N]ewly discovered evidence 
that is merely impeaching is unlikely to reveal that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice. There must be something more . 
. . suggest[ing] directly that the defendant was convicted 
wrongly.” Id. at 392. Whiteford and Wheeler fail to meet this 
standard; that is, they fail to demonstrate how the fact of 
Bloom‟s “coaching” would “probably produce an acquittal” 
were it presented to a jury. The court found “not a scrap of 
information to the effect that Mr. Bloom falsified his 
testimony on the basis of whatever this young attorney was 
                                                 
10
Note, however, that only Wheeler included the jury 
instructions issue in his post-judgment motion requesting a 
new trial. Thus, the analysis of the jury instructions as to 
Whiteford is for plain error. United States v. Bey, 736 F.2d 
891, 895 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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allegedly signaling to him.” Accordingly, the discovery of 
Bloom‟s “coaching” does not warrant a new trial. See Duke v. 
United States, 255 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 1958) (“We 
entirely disapprove of the practice of any witness in a 
criminal case, especially a government witness, receiving 
secret advice from anyone while he is on the stand. It is a 
destructive precedent. But, in the present case, it obviously 
did not harm [the defendant] . . . . The error was not 
prejudicial.”).11 
Defendants also seek a new trial because the court did 
not include the names of the co-conspirators in the jury 
instructions.
12
 We disagree. In the indictment, the government 
alleged that Whiteford and Wheeler “did knowingly conspire 
. . . with Bloom, Hopfengardner, Stein and other persons 
known and unknown to the Grand Jury” to commit the 
conspiratorial schemes listed. When indictments are written 
in such a manner, so as to include more than one named co-
conspirator, the identity of the additional co-conspirator(s) is 
                                                 
11Additionally, for “newly discovered evidence” to warrant a 
new trial under Rule 33, there must be “diligence on the part 
of the movant” to discover the evidence and bring it to the 
attention of the court. United States v. Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 
458 (3d Cir. 2006). Arguably, Whiteford and Wheeler fell 
short of the “diligence” requirement in failing to request 
additional cross-examination of Bloom, after suspecting that 
he was being coached.  
12
In discussing the conspiracy charge, the jury instructions 
mentioned only the names of the three defendants – 
Whiteford, Wheeler, and Morris.  
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not treated as an element of the offense. United States v. De 
Cavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1272 (3d Cir. 1971) (“The 
existence of an agreement, rather than the identity of those 
who agree, is the essential element to prove the crime of 
conspiracy.”). The court‟s jury instructions for the conspiracy 
charge conformed to the law as well as to the model 
instructions of this Circuit. Compare Whiteford App. 2202-12 
(jury instructions for the conspiracy charge), with Third 
Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 6.18.371A (model 
jury instructions for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 in an 
“offenses” prosecution). Whiteford and Wheeler cite no 
authority supporting their proposition that the jury should 
have been instructed on the names of their co-conspirators. 
See United States v. Hopper, 384 F.3d 252, 257-58 (6th Cir. 
2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1136 (2005) 
(upholding the court‟s jury instructions despite the 
defendant‟s claim that they caused him prejudicial error in 
failing to specify the identity of his co-conspirators); United 
States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding the court‟s jury instructions in a conspiracy case 
where they referred to “two or more persons” but not any 
named individuals). 
IV. 
 Wheeler contends the court erred in declining to grant 
his motion to suppress statements he made to the police after 
his arrest, and the weapons recovered from his house. He 
argues the statements should be suppressed because his 
Miranda waiver had been deficient and his “testimony” to the 
police involuntary, and the weapons seized were fruit of the 
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poisonous tree. We review the denial of Wheeler‟s motion 
“for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and 
exercise[] plenary review of the District Court‟s application 
of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 
318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 The court properly denied Wheeler‟s motion. 
Beginning with Wheeler‟s Miranda waiver, there is nothing 
to suggest it was deficient. The decision to waive one‟s Fifth 
Amendment rights must be the product of “a deliberate choice 
to relinquish the protection those rights afford.” Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010). A court will 
inquire first, whether “the relinquishment of the right [was] 
voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and 
deliberate choice,” and second, whether the waiver was made 
“with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). Wheeler‟s 
signing of the “Advice of Rights” form satisfies this standard. 
He was not intimidated nor coerced, and his level of 
education would have enabled him to read the form and 
comprehend its meaning. Berghuis, 120 S. Ct. at 2262 
(holding a Miranda waiver was valid when the defendant 
“received a written copy of the Miranda warnings . . . could 
read and understand English . . . [and] was given time to read 
the warnings”). Although Wheeler argues the agents‟ failure 
to inform him of the specific charges against him subjected 
him to “psychological pressure,” he points to nothing that 
might show his “will was overcome or [his] capacity for self-
control vitiated.” United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 
1089 (3d Cir. 1989). He also cites no authority, and we are 
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aware of none, holding that a defendant must know of the 
charges against him to validate a Miranda waiver. 
 Wheeler‟s reference to his attorney – which he made 
before signing the Advice of Rights form – does not change 
the analysis. When the agents arrived, Wheeler informed 
them he had consulted an attorney and that the attorney 
directed him to cooperate unless he “got stumped.” These 
remarks were not an objectively identifiable request for 
counsel, and they did not amount to an invocation of 
Wheeler‟s Fifth Amendment rights. See Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (“[I]f a suspect makes a 
reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that 
a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right 
to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of 
questioning.”). Accordingly, Wheeler‟s remark about his 
attorney did not make his subsequent Miranda waiver invalid. 
 Furthermore, there is no evidence demonstrating that 
after Wheeler signed the Miranda waiver form, his statements 
to the police and his consent to the search of his house were 
involuntary. While in his driveway, Wheeler informed the 
officers the weapons from Fort Bragg were in his bedroom, 
and he offered to lead them to the spot. He then signed a 
consent form authorizing a search of his house, and helped 
the officers gain entry. Wheeler participated in a one and a 
half hour discussion in his kitchen, during which he answered 
questions and retrieved documents the agents requested. 
Throughout, there were no threats, nor raised voices, nor did 
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Wheeler indicate he wished to stop answering questions. 
There was no indication his will was overborne. 
 Accordingly, the court did not err in finding Wheeler‟s 
statements and the physical items retrieved from his house 
admissible.  
V. 
 Whiteford and Wheeler contend the court erred in 
refusing to grant use immunity to co-conspirator Debra 
Harrison. Wheeler requested immunity for Harrison in a pre-
trial motion, which the court denied, and Whiteford raises the 
immunity issue for the first time on appeal. We review for 
abuse of discretion with respect to Wheeler‟s claim, Perez, 
280 F.3d at 348, and for plain error with respect to 
Whiteford‟s, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 
(1993). 
 Use immunity may be conferred by a judge when a 
witness refuses to testify. It prohibits the government from 
using the witness‟s compelled testimony in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution against him, except in select cases. 18 
U.S.C. § 6002. Wheeler requested use immunity for Harrison 
so she could testify as a defense witness and be precluded 
from invoking her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. The government opposed this request, because 
it had an interest in continuing to prosecute Harrison on the 
charges to which she had not pled guilty and because her 
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sentencing hearing was scheduled for after the trial.
13
 A 
magistrate judge recommended that Wheeler‟s motion be 
denied, and the court adopted this recommendation.  
There are two instances in which a defense witness 
may be granted use immunity in the interests of due process: 
first, where the prosecution has shown a “deliberate intent to 
disrupt the factfinding process”; second, where the testimony 
is “essential to the defense case and when the government has 
no strong interest in withholding use immunity.” Government 
of V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 975 (3d Cir. 1980). Only the 
second category is relevant here, because neither Whiteford 
nor Wheeler have alleged the government intended to disrupt 
the factfinding process. Instead, Wheeler claimed in his pre-
trial motion that Harrison‟s testimony was “essential to his 
defense” because she would state that he did not know she 
was transporting stolen funds when they traveled together, 
and that he acted innocently when he took possession of the 
weapons in North Carolina. On appeal, Whiteford alleges 
Harrison‟s testimony would also have been “essential 
exculpatory evidence,” because she would have “corroborated 
Whiteford‟s claim that he did not know [the co-conspirators] 
were stealing.”  
                                                 
13
The government wanted to avoid having to face a Kastigar 
hearing down the road, at which it would have to prove that 
immunized testimony was not being used against Harrison in 
her prosecution. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 
462 (1972). 
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The court‟s refusal to grant use immunity to Harrison 
was not in error. To be essential to one‟s defense, testimony 
must be “clearly exculpatory.” United States v. Cohen, 171 
F.3d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1999); Smith, 615 F.2d at 974. 
Testimony that is “ambiguous . . . cumulative, or . . . found to 
relate only to the credibility of the government‟s witnesses” 
will not meet this bar. United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 
964 (3d Cir. 1981). The court‟s determination that Harrison‟s 
testimony would not be “clearly exculpatory” for Wheeler 
was not an abuse of discretion, because in multiple portions 
of Harrison‟s statements to the police, she inculpated 
Wheeler. See Perez, 280 F.3d at 350 (holding a witness‟s 
anticipated testimony was not “clearly exculpatory” when it 
was going to be undercut by a prior inconsistent statement 
implicating the defendant). The denial was not plain error as 
to Whiteford, because there is no indication Harrison would 
have provided “clearly exculpatory” testimony essential to his 
defense.  
VI. 
Whiteford and Wheeler raise several challenges to 
their sentences. We review a district court‟s sentence in a 
two-staged inquiry. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 
567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). First, we ask whether the court 
committed any “significant procedural error” when imposing 
the sentence – such as “failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, [or] failing to consider the §3553(a) factors.” Id. 
Next, we review the “substantive reasonableness” of the 
sentence, focusing on the totality of circumstances. Id. “The 
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abuse-of-discretion standard applies to both our procedural 
and substantive reasonableness inquiries.” Id. (citing Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)).  
Whiteford challenges his sentence on two grounds: 
first, he contends the court erred in its “loss calculation,” 
which it used to derive the guidelines range for his conspiracy 
conviction; second, he contends the court gave inadequate 
consideration to the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a). Both claims lack merit. With respect to the loss 
calculation, the court held the losses attributable to 
Whiteford‟s bribery objective should be equal to the value of 
the “reasonably foreseen” bribes of Whiteford and his co-
conspirators. These bribes included automobiles, laptops, 
watches, and airplane tickets purchased by Bloom for 
Whiteford, Hopfengardner, and Stein, and they totaled 
$159,891. The court‟s calculations were proper. According to 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b), a court may include the “reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity” when determining the 
“losses” caused by a defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States v. Robinson, 603 F.3d 230, 
233-34 (3d Cir. 2010). There was ample evidence at trial that 
Whiteford knew of – or could reasonably have foreseen – 
each bribe in the loss calculation. Thus, the $159,891 
estimation was factually and legally sound.
14
 
                                                 
14It is also worth noting that the court‟s loss calculation was 
considerably more conservative than that in the PSR. The 
court calculated the losses to be $159,891, which triggered a 
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 Whiteford also contends the court failed to adequately 
consider the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He 
alleges it overlooked “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants,” see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), 
because it sentenced him to 60 months while his co-
conspirators received lower terms. But the court considered 
each § 3553(a) factor and specifically mentioned the need to 
avoid “unwarranted disparities.” It concluded 60 months was 
proper for Whiteford, given “the gravity of someone who was 
in [his] position” participating in the conspiracy. This 
determination was substantively reasonable. See Quiles, 618 
F.3d at 397 (“[A] defendant does not have a right to be 
sentenced equally with his co-defendants.”).   
Wheeler brings three challenges to his sentence, all of 
which we reject. First, he contends the court erred in 
imposing a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 
2C1.1(b)(3), when it calculated the offense level for the 
bribery objective of his conspiracy conviction. A four-level 
increase is applied when a theft or fraud offense “involve[s] 
an elected public official or any public official in a high-level 
decision-making or sensitive position.” U.S.S.G. § 
2C1.1(b)(3). The court held § 2C1.1(b)(3) should apply to 
Wheeler because as a project officer at CPA-SC, he was an 
“integral participant in the bidding, and contracting, and 
payment process.” Wheeler‟s “signatures had to be on 
recommendations for projects before they went to the contract 
                                                                                                             
level enhancement of 10 for the bribery objective. The PSR 
calculated the losses to be over $ 1 million, triggering a level 
enhancement of 16. See PSR ¶¶ 186, 189.  
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officers for review” and he was privy to confidential 
information about the CPA‟s scopes of work and bid 
specifications. The court‟s conclusion was reasonable. See 
U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. 4(A) (defining a “[h]igh-level 
decision-making or sensitive position” as one “characterized 
by . . . a substantial influence over the decision-making 
process”).  
Second, Wheeler argues the court erred in imposing a 
six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) when 
it calculated the offense level for the firearms objective of his 
conspiracy conviction. Wheeler‟s claim lacks merit. To count 
the firearms involved, the court tallied “all of the unregistered 
firearms that were possessed by Stein, Wheeler, and Harrison 
as of the day that they‟re all standing at Stein‟s house 
divvying up those weapons.” It found “40 or so” weapons 
“were encompassed within that entire transaction.” This 
calculation was proper. Section 2K2.1(b) provides that all 
firearms “involved” in an “offense” are to be included in the 
firearms count for the level enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1(b)(1). Wheeler‟s “offense” was conspiring to possess 
and transport unregistered firearms, and including all 
“unregistered firearms” in the possession of Stein, Wheeler 
and Harrison on the day they divided up the weapons was 
reasonable. The attachment of the six-level enhancement was 
proper. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) (providing a six-level 
enhancement for a firearms count of 25-99). 
Finally, Wheeler contends the court failed to 
adequately consider the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) 
because it overlooked the need to avoid unwarranted 
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disparities when determining his sentence. Wheeler is 
incorrect. The court discussed each § 3553(a) factor when it 
set his sentence, again mentioning the disparity factor. It 
explained why 42 months‟ imprisonment was a fair term for 
Wheeler as compared to the sentences for his co-conspirators, 
given his high position of authority in Iraq. The court‟s 
procedures were proper and its sentence was substantively 
reasonable. 
VII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgments of conviction and sentences. 
